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SUPPLEMENTAL FACTS 
Plaintiff brought this action against Monte Vista 
Ranch, Inc. and its former shareholders to collect a real 
estate commission (R. 1-4) . The shareholders sold the 
corporation's assets (consisting mainly of real property) to 
Leland Fitzgerald by selling their stock in Monte Vista (R. 
182-195). Plaintiff procured the sale (R. 152) . The 
Earnest Money Agreement between Monte Vista and its former 
shareholders and Leland Fitzgerald required Fitzgerald to 
pay plaintiff's real estate commission (R. 152). In a prior 
action, plaintiff sued Fitzgerald for his commission. 
Plaintiff first alleged that he had some kind of a joint 
purchase agreement with Fitzgerald (R. 153, 253). Plaintiff 
later amended that pleading to simply sue for a commission 
(R. 153). 
Plaintiff lost the prior action against 
Fitzgerald. The record does not show what Fitzgerald's 
specific defense to plaintiff's claims was (R. 253). The 
trial court in this case acknowledged that the basis of the 
decision against plaintiff on his claim against Fitzgerald 
was unclear (Id.) 
In its memorandum decision, the trial court refers 
to Wallace Ohran. Mr. Ohran was Monte Vista's president and 
a major shareholder before the sale to Fitzgerald. The 
other individual defendants are Monte Vista's other former 
shareholders (R. 182-195). Neither Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. 
-1-
nor its former shareholders were sued by plaintiff in the 
prior action (R. 17) • 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants did not introduce any evidence of what 
the prior case was all about. They relied solely on the 
reported appellate decision of the prior case. That deci-
sion does not reveal what the underlying issues really were 
in the prior case. Thus, defendants did not meet their 
burden of showing that no material issue of fact on the res 
judicata and collateral estoppel claims. The trial court 
relied upon defendants' incomplete submission and reached 
the wrong result. 
The determination that the trial court erred can 
be made from the materials of record in this case. 
The State of Frauds does not preclude recovery 
because Ohran admitted the existence of plaintiff's contract 
in court and because the "contract was fully performed. 
Additionally, the sale ultimately became a sale of stock to 
which the Statute of Frauds does not apply rather than a 
sale of real property. 
POINT I 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING WAS 
BASED UPON AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION 
Defendants admitted plaintiff did not file any 
complaint against Monte Vista Ranch or its former sharehold-
ers in the prior action (R. 17) . Defendants admitted that 
Fitzgerald filed a third-party complaint against Monte 
Vista's former shareholders (R. 17). Fitzgerald's 
third-party complaint in the prior action was for indemnifi-
cation from Monte Vista's former shareholders if plaintiff 
recovered from Fitzgerald (R. 17). 
The issues in Fitzgerald's third-party indemnifi-
cation suit were completely different than the issues 
plaintiff asserted against Fitzgerald. (See plaintiff's 
original brief, pp. 14-16). The indemnification suit was 
based upon language in the stock purchase agreement between 
Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's former shareholders to the 
effect that each party would reimburse the other for any 
liability for commissions (R. 189). Such an arrangement was 
circular. Under those terms, ultimate payment would depend 
on whom plaintiff sued first. But the Earnest Money Agree-
ment between Fitzgerald and Monte Vista's former sharehold-
ers clearly stated that as between Monte Vista's former 
shareholders and Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald would be responsible 
(R. 152). Thus, the court in the prior action ruled that 
Fitzgerald would be liable to plaintiff (R. 155). 
This ruling was referred to in a jury instruction 
(R. 155) . Both in its ruling on res judicata and in its 
ruling on collateral estoppel, the trial court assumed that 
one result of the prior action was that "the courts hearing 
the previous action" were persuaded " that liability for the 
commission cannot be imputed to the defendant Ohran" (R. 
251-254, quoting from 253). A copy of the trail court's 
order is attached as Exhibit "A". 
As against plaintiff
 f the courts in the prior 
action could not and did not make that determination because 
plaintiff did not bring any claim against Monte Vista or its 
shareholders in that prior action (R. 17) . The trial 
court's ruling was based upon an assumption that was clearly 
erroneous. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE DEMONSTRATES THAT 
THE COURT DID NOT HAVE ANY ADEQUATE RECORD 
OF THE PRIOR CASE BEFORE IT 
Defendant argues that the rule that the court must 
independently examine the record of a prior case before 
making a res judicata or collateral estoppel ruling is not 
applicable because there was a reported appellate decision 
of the case against Fitzgerald, Defendants did not cite any 
authority for their argument. Further, collateral estoppel 
and res judicata require a showing that the issues in the 
prior case and the pending one are the same. Searle Bros. 
v. Searle, 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). Even if defendants 
could rely on a reported decision, any such opinion would 
have to be complete enough to make that determination. It 
is not enough to just show plaintiff lost. 
The record in this case demonstrates that the 
reported decision, Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 
626 P.2d 453 (Utah 1981), was not complete enough to make a 
proper determination of collateral estoppel. The reported 
decision mentioned plaintiff's contention that the verdict 
should have been directed in his favor. But the court 
disposed of that argument without specifying what the actual 
claims of the parties were. The majority of the reported 
decision simply dealt with the adequacy of a jury instruc-
tion. The appellate decision did not go into significant 
detail on specific allegations or specific conclusions. 
The trial court admitted in its memorandum deci-
sion that it did not know what the actual arrangement was 
between plaintiff and Fitzgerald: 
Although the Utah Supreme was unable to 
determine from the record the exact 
nature of the dealings between Florence 
and Fitzgerald, the court noted several 
facts that cast serious doubt on 
whether any money that passed or would 
have passed between them should be 
characterized as a commission (upon 
Fitzgerald's agreement to pay it), 
Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were 
still negotiating as to their possible 
joint purchase of the assets of Monte 
Vista. 
(R. 253). 
After expressing this uncertainty, the trial court 
clearly showed that its decision on collateral estoppel as 
well as res judicata was based on its assumption that the 
court made a determination that Monte Vista's former share-
holders did not owe anybody (including plaintiff) anything: 
Irrespective of the actual agreement 
that emerged between Fitzgerald and 
Florence, this court is persuaded, as 
were the courts hearing the previous 
action, that liability for the commis-
sion cannot be imputed to the defendant 
Ohran" [Monte Vista's former sharehold-
er] . 
(R. 253). 
As we have shown, that conclusion was wrong. 
Defendants admitted plaintiff did not bring an action 
against Monte Vista or its former shareholder in the prior 
action (R. 17). Thus determination that Monte Vista and its 
former shareholders owed nothing to plaintiff could not 
possibly have been made. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT MEET THEIR 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
Defendants argue that plaintiff is, nevertheless, 
collaterally estopped from asserting any claims against 
Monte Vista or its former shareholders because the prior 
action at least determined that Fitzgerald did not owe 
plaintiff anything. But, before collateral estoppel could 
apply, we would need to know why the prior court made that 
decision. We would need to know what the precise issues 
were. Schear v. State, 657 P.2d 689 (Utah 1983). 
The fact that plaintiff did the work which pro-
cured the sale is not disputed. The Earnest Money Agreement 
establishes that fact by specifying that plaintiff's commis-
sion should be taken care of (R. 152) . The record also 
establishes that plaintiff was only paid $5,000 (R. 154) on 
what was at least a $1,400,000 sale (R. 185). 
By specifying that plaintiff's real estate commis-
sion was to be paid, defendants acknowledged plaintiff 
procured the sale and earned a commission of some kind (R. 
152) . The record also contains a six page transcript from 
Wallace Ohranfs deposition in the prior case (R. 81-87), a 
copy of which is attached as Exhibit "B" hereto). In that 
transcript, Ohran admits that the shareholders at one time 
agreed to pay plaintiff a 6% commission (R. 81). 
The trial court did not understand the basis for 
the decision in the prior case (R. 25 3). We have shown that 
it could not have been based on failure to perform, or 
payment which would be the usual reasons. The record in 
this case shows that plaintiff and Fitzgerald were negotiat-
ing some kind of a joint purchase of the subject property 
that never took place (R. 146-147, 154, 253). 
It was defendants1 burden to show that collateral 
estoppel applies. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332 
(Utah 1979). Mere assertions that no genuine fact question 
exists are no more valid than mere assertions that a fact 
question exists. See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 
1983) . 
For collateral estoppel to apply, defendants would 
have to show what the precise issues in the prior case 
were — not just that plaintiff lost. Defendants did not 
introduce any evidence on what the underlying contentions 
and facts were in the prior case and relied solely on the 
incomplete reported decision. (See plaintiff's original 
brief, pp.11-14). Defendants did not meet their burden. 
After reviewing defendants' authorities, plaintiff 
acknowledges that defendants are probably right when they 
argue the material not in the record (Exhibits C and D to 
plaintiff's brief in chief) cannot be considered on appeal. 
But the trial court erred by ruling without considering 
similar material. The record in this case demonstrates that 
defendants did not meet their burden of showing that no 
material fact issue exits concerning the application of res 
judicata or collateral estoppel. The court does not have to 
consider materials not in the record to make that determina-
tion. 
POINT IV 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE 
OHRAN ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT 
The trial court properly refused to base its 
decision on the Statute of Frauds (R. 251-254) . An admis-
sion in pleadings, depositions, or in open court satisfies 
the Statute of Frauds. Bentley v. Potter, 694 P. 2d 617 
(Utah 1984). Defendants admitted that a contract existed. 
Ohran admitted on page 528, lines 10-14 of the 
prior cases1 transcript that Monte Vista's shareholder's 
agreed to pay plaintiff a 6% commission. The relevant 
testimony came in as follows: 
Q: (By Mr. DeBry) The question was: "Tell me, 
to the best of your recollection, what was 
said during this conversation." And do you 
recall at that time that you testified: "I 
told Mr. Florence that we would agree to sell 
the property to his buyers and to pay him a 
six percent commission." Was that your 
testimony at this time we gave the deposi-
tion? 
A: (By Wallace Ohran) That was my testimony, 
that is right. (R. 234-235). 
Defendants assert that this admission is not 
sufficient because the term "we" allegedly does not identify 
the promisors. In context, however, it clearly refers to 
Monte Vista and its former shareholders. Moreover, it is 
well established that ambiguities in the materials used to 
satisfy the Statute of Frauds can be resolved by parol 
evidence. Johnson v. Allen, 158 P.2d 134 (Utah 1945); 
Johnson v. Ogle, 181 P.2d 789 (Mont. 19 ) ; 72 Am Jur.2d 
"Statute of Frauds" §296. This includes the identity of a 
party. 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §297 n.45, n.46. 
Defendants further protest on the grounds that 
plaintiff merely referred the court to the admission and did 
not set it out fully for the trial court. But defendants 
themselves set the quote out fully in their own memorandum 
to the trial court (R. 234-235) . They did not assert that 
plaintiff's citation was wrong or argue that plaintiff 
needed to do more to place the issue before the court. 
(Id.). The matter was presented to the trial court with 
defendants1 approval as to the form of submission. They 
cannot complain now. Board of Education of Salt Lake City 
v. Bothwell & Swanor, 400 P.2d 568 (Ut. 1965).1 
Additionally, the contention that plaintiff 
should have borne the burden of setting forth the actual 
testimony is raised from the first time on appeal. Even if 
there were merit to this argument, it should not be 
considered for that reason alone. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 
405 (Utah 1977). 
Defendants also ignore other writings and admis-
sions. Admittedly, the phrase in the Earnest Money Agree-
ment that makes Fitzgerald responsible to pay plaintiff's 
commission (as between Monte Vista's former shareholders and 
Fitzgerald) does not specify the amount of plaintiff's 
commission. Arguably, that could be supplied by custom. 
Richards v. Hodson, 485 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971); Ney v. 
Harrison, 299 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1956); 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute 
of Frauds" §297. At the minimum, the Earnest Money Agree-
ment (R. 152 and attached as Exhibit "C") together with the 
Stock Sale Agreement (R. 182-195) , conclusively shows that 
Monte Vista's former shareholders are the "we" referred to 
in Ohran's admission. The material necessary to satisfy the 
Statute of Frauds need not be contained in one writing but 
may be pieced together from several sources. Fritsch v. 
Hess, 162 P. 70 (Utah 1916); 72 Am Jur.2d "Statute of 
Frauds" §371. 
Ohran's actual deposition testimony referred to in 
his in-court admission is attached as Exhibit B. It is part 
of the record (R. 81-87). Using the term "we," Ohran admits 
to an agreement to pay plaintiff a 6% commission on the sale 
of the property (R. 81) . It is clear from the transcript 
that the "we" refers to Monte Vista and its former share-
holders. (See, for example, R.84, lines 23 and 24; R. 85, 
line 13, and the entire context of the admission). 
1 n 
POINT V 
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE THE CONTRACT WAS FULLY PERFORMED 
Part performance generally satisfies the Statute 
of Frauds. 73 Am Jur.2d "Statute of Frauds" §405, et. seq. 
Utah follows the general rule. Greenwood v. Jackson, 128 
P.2d 282 (Utah 1942). In the present case, plaintiff fully 
performed. This is not just a part performance case. 
Defendants rely heavily on Smith Realty Co. v. 
Dipietro, 292 915 (Utah 1930) and Case v. Ralph, 188 P. 40 
(Utah 1920) to support their conclusion that the doctrine of 
part performance does not apply in situations where a real 
estate broker seeks his commission when no written contract 
for that commission exists. Both Smith Realty Co. v. 
-
Dipietro, supra and Case v. Ralph, supra were decided before 
the Rules of Court Procedure were liberalized to permit 
notice pleading. A close reading of both those cases shows 
that they were each decided on the basis that the plaintiffs 
did not adequately allege that any kind of a contract for a 
commission existed. 
Defendants also cite Young v. Buchanan, 259 P. 2d 
876 (Utah 1953) and Watson v. Odell, 198 P. 772 (Utah 1921). 
Neither of these cases actually held that full performance 
does not satisfy the Statute of Frauds in real estate 
commission cases. Watson v. Odell, supra, held that the 
real estate agent could not recover under the specific 
wording of his contract where the underlying sale did not 
occur. Young v. Buchanan, supra held that an unlicensed 
real estate agent could not use a licensed broker's license 
when he was acting as an independent contractor rather than 
an employee• To be sure, the cases defendants cite hold 
that a real estate commission cannot be recovered under a 
quantum merit theory. But they do not establish any rule 
that full performance of an express contract cannot satisfy 
the Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases. 
To plaintiff's knowledge, the only Utah case which 
has squarely decided whether full performance satisfies the 
Statute of Frauds in real estate commission cases is Kerr v. 
Hillyard, 170 P. 981 (Utah 1918). That case held full 
performance would satisfy the Statute of Frauds. Like Kerr 
v. Hillyard, the pending case does not involve a situation 
where the agent found a willing buyer but the sale did not 
go through. The contract was not just partly performed, it 
was fully performed. That satisfies the Statute of Frauds. 
POINT VI 
PLAINTIFF DID NOT ACT AS A 
SECURITIES BROKER DEALER 
The sale in this case was finally effected as a 
sale of stock (R. 182-195). Thus, the Statute of Frauds 
should not apply at all. 
The argument that the Statute of Frauds still 
applies because plaintiff was not a licensed securities 
broker is without merit. First, plaintiff never intended to 
arrange a stock sale (R. 152) . He always felt he was 
selling property. He did not take part in changing the form 
of the transaction and did not even learn that the form of 
transaction had been changed until well after the Stock 
Purchase Agreement had been executed (R. 197-198)• 
Secondly, the transaction was an isolated one. 
The Securities Laws in effect at that time defined a securi-
ties "broker-dealer" as a person "engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others or for his own account." Section 61-1-13 Utah Code 
Annotated. Because the transaction was an isolated one and 
because plaintiff did not play a part in changing the form 
of the deal, plaintiff was not "in the business" of dealing 
in securities. He was not a securities "broker-dealer" and 
did not have to be licensed as such. 
Yet the sale was consummated as a sale of stock 
(R. 182-195). Thus, the transaction does not fall within 
the literal wording of the Statute of Frauds. 
CONCLUSION 
The real issue in this case is not res judicata, 
collateral estoppel, or the Statute of Frauds. The real 
issue in this case is whether plaintiff intended to release 
Monte Vista and its former shareholders from all liability 
when he tried to secure payment from Fitzgerald. That issue 
is a fact question that has never been addressed. The case 
should be remanded for determination of that issue. 
DATED this 3 /uA day of January, 1986. 
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MEL TRIMBLE REAL ESTATE 
of the State of Utah 
In and For Utah County 
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MONTE VISTA R A N C H r i N C , A UTAH 
CORPORATION, WALLACE D. OHRAN, 
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JOYCE T . RICE AND NELDON Defendant 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 6 0 , 7 8 4 
DATED June 3, 1985 
David Sam JUDGE 
This case is .before the court on Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss and is considered pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice 
of the District Courts. 
R U L I N G 
When examined under the doctrine of res judicata, it is apparent 
the case at bar rests on the same state of facts and evidence of the 
same character as were presented in Mel Trimble Real Estate et al v. 
Leiand A. Fitzgerald, Civil No. C-78-4944. The trial court in that 
case, after hearing the witnesses who would appear and viewing the 
documents that would be introduced in this suit, ruled as a matter 
of law, that Fitzgerald was solely liable for any real estate com-
mission that may have been owed Florence. The jury sitting in that 
action was so instructed after the court explicitly rejected an in-
struction related to third party beneficiary contracts. Undoubtedly 
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the precise issue at bar was fully and finally litigated in the 
four day trial which resulted in a verdict that no commission was 
due Florence. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
decision finding no error in the trial court's ruling or instruction. 
Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Fitzgerald, 626 P.2d 453 (1981). This 
court clearly lacks jurisdiction to review the application of law 
or findings of fact in that case and consequently lacks jurisdiction 
to relitigate the issue of liability for the alleged commission. 
Therefore, the instant action is barred under the doctrine of res 
j udicata. 
Moreover, even if this suit could be characterized as arising 
from a cause of action different from that previously tried, it is 
barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel as adopted by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Schaer v. State of Utah, 657 P.2d 1337, 1340, 
1341 (1983). Clearly, the "issue decided in the prior adjudication 
was identical with the one presented in th[is] action. . . ." Id.at 
1340. The issue at the first trial and the present issue are 
essentially the same, that is, whether a real estate commission was 
due Florence from the sale of Monte Vista Ranch, Inc. (Monte Vista), 
and if so, who should pay the commission. The record shows that 
defendant Ohran testified at that trial and was present for cross 
examination, and that evidence of the event surrounding the trans-
action was fully presented. This court is unaware of any occurence 
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subsequent to the previous trial or appeal that would lead to the 
introduction of evidence not fully considered in the previous action. 
Secondly, the previous case was "decided on its merits.11 Jjj. 
at 1341. Although the Utah Supreme Court was unable to determine 
from the record the exact nature of the dealings between Florence 
and Fitzgerald, the court noted several facts that cast serious doubt 
on whether any money that passed or would have passed between them 
should be characterized as a commission. Apparently, even after 
defendant Ohran, as seller, reduced the sales price offered by the 
amount of the claimed commission (upon Fitzgerald's agreement to 
pay it), Fitzgerald and plaintiff Florence were still negotiating 
as to their possible joint purchase of the assets of Monte Vista. 
Irrespective of the actual agreement that emerged between Fitzgerald 
and Florence, this court is persuaded, as were the courts hearing the 
previous action, that liability for the commission cannot be imputed 
to the defendant Ohran. 
Thirdly, there can be no serious claim that the issue in the 
first case was not "competently, fully, and fairly litigated." JkL 
As stated above, the Utah Supreme Court found no reversible errors 
in the previous jury trial that lasted four days and included 
testimony from and opportunity to cross examine all the witnesses 
relevant to this action. Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has 
abandoned the rule requiring mutuality of the parties in a collateral 
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estoppel case. "The established rule is that a stranger to a 
judgment may assert a judgment against one who actually litigated 
an issue that was necessarily decided by the judgment and thereby 
preclude the relitigation of the same issue." Searle v. Searle, 
588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). The exception to the requirement of 
mutuality is particularly just in the case at bar where defendant 
Ohran seeks to use the prior judgment as a shield to avoid liability 
in this suit because his alleged liability would depend on fact and 
law previously determined and applied. Therefore, even if this suit 
could be treated as arising from a cause of action different from 
that underlying the previous action, plaintiff is barred, under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, from bringing its claim against 
defendants. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear to this court that 
plaintiff is barred from bringing this action against the instant 
defendants. 
Accordingly, defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted, and 
plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Costs to 
defendants. 
D ated t h i s / / i / 6 y June, 1 985 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: Robert B. Hansen 
M. Dayle Jeffs 
Exhibit B 
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Fullmerfs Restaurant? 
A. No, I don't think so. 
v 
Q. Tell me to the best of your recollection what was said. 
I want you to recall the exact words that were used by you 
and by Mr. Florence, and by Mr. Fitzgerald. Not a summary 
but actually what the parties said. I donft want you to 
summarize what happened in the meeting. I want you to act 
as a camera or a tape recorder as well as you can remember. 
A. As I remember it, we agreed -- I agreed I should say p^ 
that we would sell the ranch to Mr. Fitzgerald for $2,000,000. 
and we would pay Mr. Cal Florence his commission.u^ 
Mr. Florence spoke up and said, "But we get the 
cattle,lf and I — I — I thought a minute, and I says, "Well, 
we have just changed the deal. The deal if $1,875,000, and 
you pay Mr. Florence his commission, but you don't get the 
cattle." ^ 
That's — and that's the gist of it. 
0. Now, that's what you said, and what did Fitzgerald say 
to that? 
A. "That's fine." 
Q. Fitzgerald agreed to that proposal? ^ ^ 
A. Right, he agreed to that. ^ 
Q. When you talked about paying Mr. Florence a commission, 
was anything said about how much of a commission? ^ 
A. We were going to pay him 6 percent, s' | 
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 Q. The conversation as I understand it was that 2 million, 
2
 you pay the 6 percent commission. When you changed the deal 
3 to $1,375,000, without the cattle, Florence would get a --
4
 A. We retained ownership of the cattle and Mr. Fitzgerald 
5 paid the commission. 
6
 Q. What was the commission of 6 percent? 
7
 A. I don't know. That's what we were going "" w e w£-£ 
8 considering. As to any arrangement between Mr. Fitzgerald 
9 and Cal, I have no knowledge of. — 
10 Q. But what was said at the meeting about how much the 
11 commission would be? 
12 A. I -- I told Mr. Fitzgerald the price was $2,000,000. 
13 We would pay a 6 percent commission. Mr. Florence said that 
H they got the cattle. I said, "No, you don't get the cattle 
15 Mr. Fitzgerald pays the commission. The deal is 
16 $1,875,000, and we keep the cattle." g V 
17 Q Mr. Fitzgerald said -- xX^ 
18 A. "That's fine." « / #V~^ 
19 0. Did Mr. Florence say anything at that point? 
20 A. I don't recall. 
21 0 Do you remember whether anything else was said during 
22 that meeting? 
23 A. No , I don' t. 
24 Q. What I'd like to do now -- she is working pretty hard --
25 May we take five minutes, and stretch, and let her relax her 
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1 hands for a minute and drink water. 
2 A. Okay. 
3 (Brief recess. ) 
4 MR. DeBRY: Let's go on the record. 
5 Q. I wanted to ask one thing to clear up
 o n e ouestion. 
6 When you said to Fitzgerald, you reduced t>y« commission, but 
7 you said you pay the commission. Why did \
 o u s a v -^--^ 
8 Why did you say to Fitzgerald you pay the ^ o m m i s s i o n ? i^y 
9 that shift? ^y 
10 A. Because Mr. Florence said, "We get the
 c a t t l e '' and I 
11 thought he was working for me. 
12 Q. When he said something about the cattl e > y o u thought he 
13 showed more loyalty for the other side, a n ^
 so y o u w a n t e d t h e 
14 other side to pay the commission? 
15 A. Right. 
16 Q. But that also enabled you to lower thb purchase price, 
17 is that true? 
18 A. Right, I lowered it the amount of the c o m m i s s i o n . ^ 
19 Q. Was it your understanding in these n e ^ o t i a t i o n s r h a C 
20 Mr. Florence was, in fact, working for boti*
 p a r r i e s , trving 
2i to put both parties together? You just s a i d t h a c h e w a s n' t 
22 working for you. 
23 A. It was my understanding he was trying
 t o m a k e a r a n c h 
24 sale. I 
25 0. Put both parties together so that he t-.ould a a k e a s a l e ? I 
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A. 
Q. 
Right. 
Have you given all the testimonv about this meeting? 
Do you have any further recollection about what was said at 
this 
A. 
n. 
Q. 
A. 
0. 
A. 
0. 
A. 
meeting? 
I think we talked about the down payment. 
T
*Ihat was said about the down payment? 
I think it was supposed to be a half a million dollars 
Did Mr. Fitzgerald -- what did he respond to that? 
He agreed. ^ 
Was anything said about the underlying mortgage? 
Not at that time. 
Remember anything else being said about closing dates or [ 
I think -- I think somewhere along the line we talked 
about closing it immediatelv after the 1st of the year. 
! o. After the meeting, did you have any further J 
conversations or contact with Mr. Florence on the subject of 
the 
! A. 
sale of the ranch or the property? 
When was the next meeting? 
I don't remember ]ust when it was , but I think we had a 
meeting with Mr. Florence and Mr. Fitzgerald, and also his j 
nephew -- is that right? -- at Howard Sherwood's 
Q. 
A. 
that 
Q. 
Who is Howard Sherwood? 
One of the stockholders, and he one of the accountants 
took care of -- J 
Where is Sherwood's office? 
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A. In American Fork. 
0. To place this in time, the meeting in American Fork, 
about how many days or weeks was that meeting after this 
meeting at Fullmer1s Restaurant? 
A. I don't know. But it had to be in December. 
Q. Who else was present at the meeting in December in 
American Fork? Tell me all the people that were present 
A. I don't believe Nelson was there, was he? 
MR. FLORENCE: At the meeting I was at, he was 
A. It was Mr. Nelson --
MR. FLORENCE: That was the final draft of the 
agreement between you and Fitzgerald and our conversation. 
All stockholders had agreed to that. 
A. Was Perry, his nephew there, too? 
MR, FLORENCE: Not at this particular meeting. 
A. There was just three of us then, Nelson, and Ohran, and 
Sherwood, and you. 
MR, FLORENCE: And Fitzgerald? 
A. And Fitzgerald. 
Q. Nelson, Ohran, Florence, and Fitzgerald, is that right? 
A. Yes. ^ 
0. That meeting was at the office of Mr. Nelson? 
A. Mr. Sherwood. 
0. Who is Mr. Sherwood? 
A. He is the accountant x^ ho took care of the books for the 
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ranch, and a stockholder in the corporation. 
Q. Remember about what time of day that meeting was held? 
A. In the afternoon? Yes. 
Q. Do you remember who called the meeting, how the meeting 
was arranged, or who set the meeting up? 
A. I think Mr. Sherwood set it up. Called Mr. Fitzgerald 
and made an appointment with him, and we met with him at the 
time that Sherwood and Fitzgerald worked out. 
Q. To your knowledge were any minutes, notes, or memoranda 
kept of that meeting? 
MR. FLORENCE: Yeah, the earnest money was --
MR. DeBRY: Let him ansx^er. 
Just whatever you remember, any minutes or 
notes or documents written down at that: meeting. 
A. The only thing that I remember is that Mr. Sherwood 
wrote down the earnest money agreement and his secretary, as J* 
I remember, he called his secretary in, and she typed it up. 
Q. Now, tell me to the best of your recollection what was 
said at that meeting. What was said and done at that meeting? 
A. As I remember, we -- Mr. Sherwood or Mr. Fitzgerald, 
rather, agreed to buy the ranch on the terms that we had 
outlined, and then Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Florence-went into 
another room and had a private conversation about their 
arrarTgauieuLs-;—aad-wftfen th£y came bacicin, Mr. Fitzgerald- says 
that he would buy the entire ranch, and he would pav Mr. 
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Florence1s commission. 
Q. TJhen he said he would buy the entire ranch, did he say 
how much? What purchase price was discussed? 
A, We had already agreed upon that. 
Q. It would be the $1,825,000 --
A. 875. 
0. Was anything else said, to your recollection, on the 
subject of the purchase? Just anything you can recall about 
the meeting? 
A. No, except that earnest money was drawn up on those --
on that agreement and also put in the earnest money, the 
buyer was to pay the commission. 
Q. Was earnest money executed at that time? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was an earnest money deposit paid? 
A. Yes. 
0. How much money? 
A. $25,000 is what he paid. 
Q. All right. Where is that earnest money at the present 
time, if you know, earnest money agreement? 
A. In Mr. Sherwood's office. 
Q. Now, after that meeting, have you ever at any time had 
any conversation with Mr. Fitzgerald on the subject of Mr. 
Florence's commission? ^/ 
A. No. ^y 
DAVIS & SANCHEZ, 812 BOSTON BLDG SALTUAKE CITY UTAH 84111 (8011 363-7939 
Exhibit C 
_ ^ w ^ » i x n n u u r K l U I ' U K C H A S E 
T/)»Tfr>oy be o Jcgo/ly binding form, if nor undcrsto. ; ir*< K other advice 
iVfVUJOR* 
I TO, 
-"Us- 'of K«i."t«" Cwn>£«ny 
* IN C O N i i o i h A l ION Of yowt *».«.m#.n «t» «•* VO-* • ««©*tl »• P*»-
3 iv»'«t)» dapcttt with yow «» •*»!*•*! money |f»« ian» o< (1 
4 ,nt.,<to.mot persona 1 check 
.American Fork i***.J>L-??nhsi-J*JL321 
,. •»•.,••»• w». ./— . Lalanrl.A. -Fitzgerald 
Twenty-five Thousand Dollars , 
. . 8 , r , v . C O H M ^ U a.. . .AlL.chat proper t*. sojd .by Co-qnrratlve Securit ies^ 
Jl0 .tP°ration to Wallace Ohran TOO re coaoonly known an the Cedar Valley Ranchj 
_ 1 nc 1 ud_ip£._a 1 JLltnproyroents.»_yajt_er_rightSj__s_p.rink 1 ing,_systens, and equipment. 
Ih iS-^ l£I_9 x J^y4£S_the_S^^ .Range 2 Vest sold on Uniform Real £ 
JTILP ?• r a ct to Blue _G r a s s_JTurf Farms. I n c . , David Pen n in g ton, President, 
C»»r Utah COM«1,, » Utah 
-no -exceptions — -
»«.••>..«.»{ fM.u,f.«t p<of<«'<v »*•«• ««vo »« mciwe«a •» o*»» o* i*» e>o»«' iv e u K ^ w d . . n o n e 
1f»» IOI«l pw'«IWi»# » • * • 0» % ijt* QllLt " ^ P — 
_2JU)0Q 
» One Million Eight Hundred pevonty-Five Thousand 
.AIliQoo^ XXXXXX^^XJ;^ 
January 15__ 
an d«M«««v oi ©<<« of !.<• 
i• ^  .*-«• eqavi 1 anun 1 _instaHments overXXZ'JXXZY. 
_ a .period o_f_ ten Year s f rop date oJLsa 1 e_ 
-^^^m^^ssm^A^^^ca 
.i-Alcrs agree .that . a c r e a g e s ! 11 . ixe.reicasad-to-buyer i!fter e x i s t i n g nhL±£,~LLonz-Lo 
„Co-PporatiYe_Security_ Corp *^-lia&..be.eiL-satisf l e d , .upon rmysu-.nt £>£.-SJL,Z50-£ia_piir_iicr 
..principal payment_for i rr iga ted acrcage_and/or .$200.00 pt-r. acre principaJL.;^>Ticnt-for. d.ry..land_ac.rcage, 
l n ^ m t M i t<(M./^  |n« w»(M<0 lf4U«>(«. twhi«il In l"« i«m«l«lt«At ul «ny m»(l|<fi o# «•«!•»<I br !•»« »«»•< n«>«<n «%»w»«'0 «nn . - - 8 . 
i
 r . o t -« i 
ir,....... ..«.p» real--estate .taxes -to. be .-apportioned 
)»tt i«««. V«w*« l_J-C««««t»»4J ^ J . Vip4H !••»* »A«/«« C*««noot [
 iaV>««w««k I J . Cult »nfl Cwtlt' LJ.Sp<l»*<S 
C o n t i a c t of S*l« or I n t l r u m e n t of Convry«nct to tX m*<J« on th« approved f o r m of tr>« Ut»n Oept o< 8u«inet i RrQuUl ion In tn« n«nt« of 
to -be .determined. prlnr.. to r los ing, .da tr , 
J L 5 - _a»ys l<pm e*i« »«r«ol, * 
<*PtMw*«o ir%« •*!!«•« of if»« f**OA#y »»«•••« in t ip i ta »t«M c««U«< tfMt oll#» «<i>vowl «Mm«o* to »H« m>«inn>«| ••»•*!. 
tn tn» •v*m t*«« p*Mcn*»«i U»t 1» p*» 1*M» ©»•*»**• •< «•*« »M«cfu»«* »>*€««« <o«vwp««i« M*« »*<•«,*«•*« t% •*••»*« p>»«>•»«, «»«• tmewott p*>« »i*i««n »n«»i. «t «rt» optxv* c 
b« i*t#«*»«o *» i»«wi«4««a «na ««•«•« ««m«ort. 
tt •* wno»'»too« »r>0 «$•••« IIWI lit* l««mi «r«tll«M «n |hi» r*<«ip| coniiltwl* I'M vnltr* **««»>*tt«««ry Co"1»«tt •••«»•*•« 1*«* p%i«crv«»«> «nd »•*• u M i , ««d ln«t no %«>o«l i i i t i n n 
«»yO>M t(Ult«« (« t**» »«««*«<l»0*» tn«ll t>« (gniHwid Id b* I M»» • ! I»»H (••«MCI*«M» MM** * «*<0*pO««l«« IM W H I I H | N**»m ll it t*nnmi «o*«*d «A«l «.«wl<0« Ol f>« |,/v«| <p< 
<u>ov<i« tr»<« C««n«»i U o n t f n«c««pl •»»• 0»««« la P»»«i»»«»« 
"" BM5Ti«"To»»»p*'Af *" 
« i W« 0<« tvrivpy «r»» IO C«*ty 0*>l 4n<) twtltH lt»« l*«mt «*«) »0*»0««»»«* k|M4l<>*« •»«•«, »^« l*»* **'*•• *•••*% (O !-•«.«•» »/M%0 ••>« m*«to«l«r.M (•«!« w»tH «Li»lf*Cl p'Ow«'>l IO 0»«« O 
,..* « (~>l.«v p* !•!•• tn*w««n<* •»» th* ft«m« ol !!*• pwtC*»«M» «••»« • • r*s*k« fiM«t (••t»*v»A(« py «M«t»n|r « • • • p* . 
•n |fv» •*«»! pi M»« pi oi»w» <!»•»» •••« p<op*My, %»•»•• •»•«• •)»»riM •*»o»rw«« pi n i l * f»» ««»m «o ••»« Of •»•»• ll • ! ) * • • pAify «»n* IP t» «o. !*• *»••«« to |My ail I I ^ X M I of i r l ty tm, 
" • n i , IM ui sn% i^tu «•••*<*« owl wf IM« p«««<n tfM««of. MKIW««A«. • K I M M I M •!«•«•»•»> »••. 
l iw »r«»«« cyxvv MI «u«»»o««•l«o« of I 'M t ' lu iU of tf%« «t*Al M p»«c«#*i*«f • *M«f**««*. ! • My «4*4 ••»«! • «oi«"*mio* of . 
in u«« c«««t »«m» twi tni*>««« N»«O ft li»tt*fj co«»ti«tl w*«n »nv OI IM* toant •<«« M>«« ««"«««<» M »'n«««iiy «n«<«<««. m«t »«••««••» «»ui M e« K I ^ H U V W •«««cty 
lkcJ^Mt3f 1977 
^ 2 C 
^ % 
^ ^ 
RECEIPT 
P Y W T O T m M * i 
